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THE INTERNATIONAL monetary system has ex-
perienced another crisis, It is clearly too early to
know whether the measures adopted in the three
countries most directly affected — Germany, France,
and the United Kingdom — will be adequate to solve
the current problems. But this crisis, which rounded
out a year of turmoil following the devaluation of
sterling, has led many observers to state that the
international monetary system is in need of an over-
haul that will prevent the recurrence of such acute
difficulties. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to ask
whether this latest crisis teaches us any lessons as to
the need for international monetary reform.
The crisis arose as the result of market expecta-
tions that the German mark would soon have to be
revalued. Germany’s very large current account
surplus seemed to be chronic. It had increased
sharply during Germany’s recession of 1966-67 and
remained substantial during recovery, strengthened
by declining unit labor costs and, incidentally, by
an increase in import taxes and export rebates last
January 1. Germany had succeeded in offsetting its
large current account surplus with massive capital
outflows, but observers were becoming increasingly
doubtful that the Bundesbank would be willing or
able to maintain its easy money policy, which is a
necessary condition for the continuance of the capital
outflow in a volume more or less equal to the cur-
rent account surplus.
In these circumstances, there was widespread talk
of a possible revaluation of the deutsche mark (DM)
and an accompanying speculative flow of funds to Ger-
many. The speculative flow naturally was at the
expense primarily of the two currencies regarded as
most vulnerable — the French franc and the British
pound. But, in the absence of the speculation on an
appreciation of the DM, there would not have been
a crisis over either the franc or the pound. France
seemed to be adjusting as well as could be expected
to the disturbances of last spring, and reserve losses
had subsided, Sterling, despite poor trade figures
in October, was not under severe pressure; further-
more, it is likely that the British authorities would
have taken further steps to restrain consumer spend-
ing in any event. However, the United Kingdom and
France could not go on for long losing reserves
heavily as speculators continued to bet on a revalua-
tion of the DM.
The crisis involved the danger that a devaluation
forced on either France or the United Kingdom
could set off a chain reaction in which other countries
would also be forced to devalue. The crisis also had
political aspects, which were symbolized in the
question of which country, Germany or France,
would have to act. Movement in the exchange rate
of one would lessen if not eliminate the need for a
move in the exchange rate of the other.
The first observation we can make about this crisis
is that it was not in any direct way attributable to
the nature of the present international monetary
structure. The fact that the dollar is widely held as
a reserve currency was in no way responsible for the
difficulties. (It is notable that the market price of
gold barely rose during the eventful week of Novem-
ber 18.) One could imagine a similar crisis — in-
volving expectations of exchange rate changes and
the danger of competitive depreciation — in a Jacques
Rueff gold standard world or in a Robert Triffin con-
version account world in which there is only one
reserve asset. In other words, the so-called confidence
problem — involving the interconvertibility of two
or more reserve assets — had nothing to do with the
cause or severity of this crisis. It is one of the many
ironies of the events of the last two weeks of Novem-
ber that the international monetary crisis which em-
broiled France should not reflect the alleged weak-
nesses in the monetary system that French officials
have been pointing to for years.
The positive lesson that many observers are draw-
ing from the crisis is that there is a need for a more
flexible means of correcting payments imbalances.
It may be significant that the Wall Street Journal
recently ran an editorial calling for greater flexibility
of exchange rates.
While there is much to be said for studying ways
of facilitating exchange rate adjustment when
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believe that the recent crisis stems simply from a
fetish regarding fixed exchange rates on the part of
monetary authorities. In the case of Germany, for
example, the major obstacle to revaluation appears
to he the political fallout from a drop in farm prices
that would result from an appreciation of the DM.
It would he naive to think that Germany’s political
leaders would have becn more ready to revalue the
mark had there been in effect an approved technique
involving greater flexibility of exchange rates.
My point here is not to strike a blow against con-
sideration of techniques for limited flexibility of ex-
change rates but to call attention to the fact that
resistance to use of such techniques is not easily
overcome. If that resistance on the part of govern-
ments could he overcome, there is nothing in the
present IMF system to prevent adjustments as and
when needed.
The most powerful argument on the side of those
who favor greater exchange rate flexibility is that it
would prevent the build-up of very large imbalances
whose correction requires drastic and disruptive
action both externally and internally. If gradual
adjustment of exchange rates could occur in a routine
way without engaging the prestige of governments,
the sort of crisis just experienced would be less likely.
Perhaps another lesson from the recent experience
is that adjustments in border taxes and export rebates
can at times be a useful and less disruptive substitute
for adjustment of exchange rates. Germany has
reduced by 4 percentage points both its import taxes
and its export rebates (authorized under GATT to
compensate for domestic indirect taxes). France
has substituted a value-added tax for its 4¼%
payroll tax. This will permit France to raise
import taxes and export rebates. This tech-
nique of balance of payments adjustment is not a
complete substitute for exchange rate changes — but
that may be a virtue as well as a shortcoming. One
advantage of this technique is that it does not induce
large anticipatory capital flows. To benefit specula-
tively from this type of adjustment one must buy or
sell commodities. Another advantage is that changes
in border taxes and rebates appear less permanent
than exchange rate adjustments and may therefore
he more readily mmdertaken. But this may also be a
disadvantage, since temporary adjustments of border
taxes may not be suitable to correct structural im-
balances.
Clearly changes in border taxes and rebates in-
fluence only merchandise trade whereas exchange
rate adjustment may affect the entire balance of
payments. But the difference between the two tech-
niques may he smaller than it appears. In fact, the
impact of exchange rate changes on capital flows is
unclear, and ordinarily captial account effects are
not aimed at when exchange rates are changed. Thus
it is mainh’ current account flows other than mer-
chandise trade that are unaffected by border ad-
justments but are subject to exchange rate moves.
How serious this shortcoming is will vary from
country to country.
In any event, it seems worthwhile to examine this
technique as possibly representing — not the optimal
theoretical adjustment method but one that might
make up in acceptability and feasibility for what it
lacks in elegance. Were this approach to be adopted
more frequently and more widely, it can be en-
visioned that the GATT and the IMF would provide
multilateral surveillance over the border actions of
individual countries.
A final and hardly novel lesson from recent
experience is that domestic policies are crucially
important to the success of exchange rate adjust-
ments. The response in Britain to last year’s devalua-
tion points up this lesson. Whatever the case for
greater flexibility in the pattern of exchange rates,
adoption of such techniques will not by itself elimi-
nate balance of payments problems.
— I
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